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Abstract 
The goal of direct democracy is to bring power to change laws to ordinary citizens. However, it may 
alienate citizens because policy language is often complex, perhaps impacting citizens’ voting likeli-
hood and support for policies. We invoke theory on processing fluency and compensatory control 
motivations to explain voting likelihood and policy attitude formation. Using experiments and me-
diational analyses, we tested theorized links between policy language complexity and these out-
comes. Findings suggest that policy language complexity motivates compensatory trust in policy 
institutions but this does not likely explain decreased voting likelihood. We also found that low pro-
cessing fluency associated with reading a complexly worded policy or a policy presented in a disflu-
ent font led to lower voting likelihood and less positive policy attitudes, consistent with predictions. 
Thus, the form direct democracy often takes manipulates the amount of support garnered for policies 
and ironically encourages citizens to outsource legislation to institutional elites. 
 
Keywords: political psychology, fluency, compensatory control, voting, attitudes 
 
Democracy is a system of government in which citizens participate equally in the legisla-
tive process. Specific criteria for a democratic process have been proposed, including the 
participation of most adult permanent residents as citizens, the ability for these citizens to 
gain an “enlightened understanding” about policies, equal and effective opportunities for 
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participation toward the adoption of preferred policies, voting equality in terms of oppor-
tunity and weight, and citizens’ control of the political agenda which should always be 
open to change (Dahl, 1998, p. 37). The goal of representative democracy is to provide cit-
izens power to self-govern indirectly through elected representatives who form policies 
that citizens want. 
Representatives, of course, do not always legislate in accordance with citizens’ prefer-
ences. We see this today; a Gallup poll conducted November 7–10, 2013, revealed a record 
low of 9% of Americans approving “of the way Congress is handling its job.” An alterna-
tive form of democracy—direct democracy—is intended to bring power to the people and 
away from elites. This form of democracy in the United States—citizens voting directly on 
legislation as opposed to electing legislators—was expected to lead to more informed, en-
gaged, and efficacious citizens (Barnett, 1915; Bryce, 1910; Cree, 1892; Garner, 1907; 
Haynes, 1907; Key & Crouch, 1939; Munro, 1912; Sullivan, 1892). 
In reality, citizens are less likely to participate in direct democracy than they are to vote 
for representatives (Cronin, 1989; Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Everson, 1981). They also 
demonstrate more confusion in the context of voting on legislation compared with voting 
for candidates (Dubois & Feeney, 1998). These consequences are highlighted by the litera-
ture on “negative voting” which documents voters’ tendency to vote “no” when they are 
unsure about a policy (Bowler & Donovan, 1998; Donovan, Bowler, & McCuan, 2001; Ger-
ber, Lupia, McCubins, & Kiewiet, 2001; Jacob, 2001; Magleby, 1984). 
Some researchers argue these outcomes stem from the prohibitively confusing language 
used to describe policies (Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Magleby, 1984). They detail how direct 
democracy initiatives—statutes, amendments, or ordinances put to a popular vote—are 
written as complicated proposals riddled with inaccessible language. While some states 
mail “voter guides” with descriptions of upcoming ballot initiatives, these are sometimes 
written just as complexly as the policies (LaPalombara, 1950; Magleby, 1984). Indeed, a 
majority of surveyed voters in four states agreed ballot initiatives are so complicated that 
one cannot understand what is going on (Cronin, 1989). Further, the most common criti-
cism of direct democracy is that it is confusing (Bowler & Donovan, 1998). Longer ballots 
are associated with more abstention from voting on legislation (Cronin, 1989; Darcy & 
Schneider, 1989; Dubin & Kalsow, 1994; Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Magleby, 1984) and con-
stituents vote “no” more often on longer ballot initiatives and those appearing farther 
down the ballot (Dubin & Kalsow, 1994, 1996). Altogether, the complexity typical of poli-
cies’ language may explain high rates of abstention and degree of support for policies. 
Notwithstanding these important past findings, psychological processes remain un-
clear. We enlist literature that speak to potential cognitive and motivational consequences 
of reading complex policies, namely, we invoke theory on processing fluency (e.g., Reber, 
Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz, 2004; Wink-
ielman & Cacioppo, 2001) and compensatory control (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & 
Laurin, 2008). Following, we review mechanisms of the impact of policy language com-
plexity upon voting likelihood and policy attitudes, describe our experimental approach, 
and discuss the implications of our findings. 
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Fluency, Compensatory Trust, and Voting Likelihood 
People are motivated to perceive sources of control in their lives. When individuals feel a 
lack of personal control, agents outside the self are more likely to be perceived as in control. 
For instance, feeling one is capable of understanding political issues and able to exert con-
trol over policy allows for the perception of control within one’s life. When one feels a lack 
of such understanding and control, one is motivated to perceive control from external 
sources. This is a hypothesis derived from compensatory control theory (e.g., Kay et al., 
2008; Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & Galinsky, 2010; Shepherd & Kay, 2012). Of particular 
relevance to the current research is the finding that confusion regarding social issues leads 
individuals to trust institutions to address social issues and to avoid further information 
about the issues (Shepherd & Kay, 2012). These findings suggest that when people read 
about a policy in confusing language, they may resolve a low sense of control by trusting 
that institutional elites are successfully in control of the policy issue. This may ultimately 
lead to abstention, functionally outsourcing legislation to institutional elites. 
 
Fluency and Policy Attitude 
Psychological theory also provides an account for why policy language complexity may 
impact policy support. Namely, there is an association between the ease with which infor-
mation is cognitively processed and attitude formation (e.g., Reber et al., 1998, 2004; Wink-
ielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Greater fluency experienced when mentally processing a given 
stimulus results in a more positive attitude toward the stimulus (Schwarz, 2004). Thus, to 
the extent complex language typifies policies, this may lead individuals to support them 
less. Oppenheimer (2006) found that augmenting the complexity of personal statements 
for English graduate admissions, translations of Descartes’ writing, and sociology disser-
tation abstracts resulted in reduced judgments of authors’ intelligence—revealing negative 
attitudinal consequences of textual complexity. Parallel processes may operate in the con-
text of direct democracy, with opponents of ballot initiatives appearing to capitalize on this 
bias. This is illustrated by negative campaigns like the following from Salt Lake City: 
“CONFUSED? Many are. Play it Safe—When in Doubt, VOTE NO!” (Magleby, 1984, p. 
142). 
However, it is not obvious that this outcome should arise in the context policy language. 
The policy domain may be one in which complexity indicates a high quality, well-developed 
policy. While complexity within humanities or philosophical texts may be interpreted as 
an attempt to obscure a text’s low quality, policy may be a context in which disfluency is 
interpreted as indicating positively valenced expertise. Thus, testing the association be-
tween fluency and policy attitudes sheds light not only on direct democracy but also po-
tential boundary conditions for disfluency effects. 
 
Current Research 
If policies and their descriptions were written more fluently, would this reduce voter con-
fusion, abstention, and negative voting that characterize direct democracy? Our two ex-
periments addressed these questions. Our fluency–compensatory trust–voting hypothesis 
was that an increase in a policy’s complexity motivates compensatory trust in institutions, 
in turn lowering voting likelihood. Our fluency-policy attitude hypothesis was that greater 
S H O C K L E Y  A N D  F A I R D O S I ,  S O C I A L  P S Y C H O L O G I C A L  A N D  P E R S O N A L I T Y  S C I E N C E  6  (2 0 1 5 )  
4 
policy complexity leads to less positive policy attitudes. Study 1 addresses both of these 
hypotheses and investigated any mediating roles of processing ease. We presented partic-
ipants with a potential policy ostensibly under consideration by their state government. 
The information about the policy was adapted from Shepherd and Kay (2012) and pre-
sented to participants in either simple or complex language. 
 
STUDY 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Individuals were recruited in two waves. Wave 1 (N = 83) left our sample small despite 
considerable effort to recruit participants. A post hoc analysis revealed N = 83 offered .43 
in power for a (plausible) effect size of d = .40. Thus, we opted for a second wave, aiming 
for a final sample of N = 200 (achieving N = 198)1 for .80 in power for two-tailed tests of 
significance. 
Wave 1 was composed of students and staff at a university in Illinois. The sample was 
41% female, 18–55 years old (M = 25.21, SD = 6.99), 53% White (one participant also Latino), 
23% Asian (one participant also Latino), 12% Latino-only, 7% Black, 2% Pacific Islander 
(one participant also Asian-White), and 2% Native American–White (one participant also 
Latino). Party identification (ranging from 1 = strong Democrat to 7 = strong Republican) re-
vealed Wave 1 leaned Democrat (M = 2.81, SD = 1.37). Educational background (1 = did not 
complete high school, 1%; 2 = diploma, 7%; 3 = special training/partial college, 43%; 4 = bachelor’s 
degree [BA/BS],13%; 5 = partial graduate school, 7%; 6 = master’s, 20%; and 7 = doctorate, 9%) 
revealed that on average, participants (M = 4.11, SD = 1.57) and their parents (M = 4.43, SD 
= 1.73) had completed college. Wave 2 was composed of students (14%) and Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk) workers residing in one of the 36 US states. MTurk is a crowdsourc-
ing Internet marketplace used by some to collect data. The sample was 40% female, 18–72 
years old (M = 32.65, SD = 12.62), 70% White (one participant also Latino), 13% Asian (one 
participant also White), 9% Black (one participant also White and Latino), 4% Latino-only, 
3% Pacific Islander, and had one Native American–White participant. Participants leaned 
slightly Democrat (M = 3.38, SD = 1.61). Thirty-two percent of participants had a BA/BS, 
25% were seeking a BA/BS, 26% did not have a BA/BS, 3% were graduate students, and 
14% had graduate degrees. Forty-nine percent of participants’ parents did not have a 
BA/BS, 23% had one parent with a BA/BS, and 28% had two parents with a BA/BS. 
 
Procedure 
For Wave 1, individuals were approached on campus and offered a snack for completing 
a paper questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to read about a potential state 
initiative for adopting energy technologies described in either complex or simple language. 
The descriptions, adapted from Shepherd and Kay (2012), told participants they would 
“read about energy technologies the Illinois state government may utilize if there is 
enough support from Illinois residents leading up to and following an upcoming election,” 
and researchers want “to learn more about what individuals living in Illinois think of these 
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energy technologies and the state government’s potential use of them.” Next, participants 
read: “We are going to ask you your thoughts about a proposed ballot initiative designed 
to help Illinois deal with today’s energy issues. The ballot initiative is about the adoption 
of certain means of creating energy for Illinois.” Participants subsequently read about three 
types of energy. For example, an excerpt from the complex description explained that cel-
lulosic biofuel is “produced from lignocellulose, a structural material composed mainly of 
cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin. The cellulolysis process consists of hydrolysis on pre-
treated lignocellulosic materials. After the hydrolysis process, C5 cellulose material can be 
converted by exposing the C5 cellulose to microbial cultures that secrete anticellulose en-
zymes, which degrade the C5 cellulose cell walls of the organic material.” In the simple 
description, it was explained as “a fuel made from almost any organic input material, in-
cluding feedstock, waste, and plant material. This material is simply fed into a large tank, 
where it is exposed to micro-organisms/bacteria. These micro-organisms work to break-
down and convert the organic material into simple sugars and then into liquid ethanol, 
which can be used as a fuel. This process is comparable to the fermentation process that is 
used to create alcohol for beverages.” 
Wave 2 participants completed the questionnaire via Qualtrics online software. Univer-
sity participants received course credit; MTurk participants received payment. The proce-
dure was similar to Wave 1. However, participants indicated their state of residence and 
were ostensibly forwarded to questions for people in their state. References to their state 
were generic. As before, participants were randomly assigned to read about the policy in 
either complex or simple language. For both waves, participants completed all measures’ 
items on 7-point scales after the manipulation. 
 
Measures 
Processing ease was measured with “I can easily understand how these methods of supply-
ing energy work” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; Shepherd & Kay, 2012; M = 3.69, 
SD = 1.90). Compensatory trust was measured following this information: “In your state, 
there are a number of agencies that deal with the energy plan, including The Energy Board, 
Natural Resources Consortium, and the Department of Energy. These groups are made up 
of various scientists, politicians, policymakers, etc. The next two questions below pertain 
to these groups.” The items were: “To what extent do you trust these groups to manage 
these sources of energy properly?” and “To what extent do you trust these groups to deal 
with any issues that are associated with these sources of energy?” (1 = not at all to 7 = en-
tirely; Shepherd & Kay, 2012; α = .94, M = 4.12, SD = 1.31). Voting likelihood was measured 
with “Would you vote on the issue, or would you abstain from voting, meaning that would 
not vote on the issue at all?” (1 = definitely would not vote to 7 = definitely would vote; M = 5.18, 
SD = 1.63). Policy attitude was measured with three items: “Do you like or dislike these 
energy technologies?” “Do you like or dislike the idea of a policy of using these energy 
technologies?” (1 = strongly dislike to 7 = strongly like), and “Let’s say you were going to 
vote. Would you then vote in favor of using these technologies, or vote against them?” (1 
= definitely would vote against their use to 7 = definitely would vote for their use; α = .88, M = 4.92, 
SD = 1.09). 
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Results and Discussion 
 
We analyzed the dependent variables (DVs)—processing ease, compensatory trust (reverse 
coding2), voting likelihood, and policy attitude—as a within-participants effect and com-
plexity manipulation and wave as between-participants effects, resulting in a 4 (DV) × 2 
(complex/simple) × 2 (wave) mixed model using R multilevel modeling packages (Bates & 
Maechler, 2009; Tremblay & Ransijn, 2013). We found inequality of means between DVs, 
F(3, 588) = 58.01, p < .001, but no effect of sample wave, F(1, 588) = .08, p = .78.3 Complexity 
negatively predicted the DVs, d = –.85, F(1, 588) = 35.93, p < .001, consistent with hypothe-
ses. 
However, the effect of the manipulation was qualified by an interaction with DV factor, 
F(3, 581) = 9.03, p < .001. Analyzing the DVs separately, we found effect sizes varied. Par-
ticipants in the complex condition reported less processing ease (M = 2.90, SD = 1.86, stand-
ard error [SE] = .19) than those in the simple condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.61, SE = .16), d = –
.90, t(196) = –6.32, p < .001, greater compensatory trust (original coding) in the agencies (M = 
4.32, SD = 1.32, SE = .13) than those in the simple condition (M = 3.93, SD = 1.28, SE = .13), 
d = .30, t(196) = 2.09, p ≤ .04, lower voting likelihood (M = 4.83, SD = 1.81, SE = .18) than 
those in the simple condition (M = 5.52, SD = 1.34, SE = .13), d = –.43, t(196) = –3.06, p = .002 
and less positive policy attitudes (M = 4.77, SD = .99, SE = .10) than those in the simple 
condition (M = 5.08, SD = 1.17, SE = .12), d = –.29, t(196) = –2.03, p = .04. We found an inter-
action between DV factor and wave, F(3, 581) = 7.43, p < .001. Thus, waves differed in means 
across some DVs. Complexity interacted with neither wave, F(1, 581) = 1.75, p = .19, nor 
wave × DV factor, F(3, 578) = .30, p = .82. 
 
Fluency, Compensatory Trust, and Voting Likelihood 
Processing ease and trust in the agencies were not associated (B = –.04, SE = .05), t(196) = –
.81, p = .42. Thus, trust was not directly explained by low processing ease, suggesting that 
compensatory control processes may be separable from disfluency effects. Trust was also 
not a mediator of the effect of complexity on voting likelihood because it did not predict 
likelihood (B = –.10, SE = .09), t(196) = –1.11, p ≤ .27. Trusting the agencies may have palli-
ated aversion associated with the complex condition, but any such process does not explain 
voting likelihood. 
Analyses revealed processing ease was a good candidate as a mediator of the impact of 
complexity upon voting likelihood because it predicted likelihood (B = .29, SE = .06), t(196) 
= 5.00, p < .001 (Baron & Kenny, 1986). When voting likelihood was regressed on both pro-
cessing ease and condition (simple = 0, complex = 1), the effect of complexity was reduced 
to nonsignificance (see fig. 1). We investigated this mediational pathway with bootstrap-
ping (Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2010) using 10,000 simulations. The mediation 
effect was B = –.40 with a 95% quasi-Bayesian confidence interval (CI) of [–.65, .19], corrob-
orating that processing ease mediates the impact of policy complexity on voting likelihood. 
Thus, the fluency–compensatory trust–voting hypothesis that an increase in a policy’s 
complexity would motivate a compensatory increase in institutional trust and in turn 
lower voting likelihood was partially borne out. Policy complexity appears to motivate 
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trust in policy institutions, and the low processing ease of a complexly worded policy at-
tenuates voting likelihood, but these outcomes appear separable. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Low processing ease mediates the negative impact of complexity on voting like-
lihood. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Fluency and Policy Attitude 
Analyses revealed processing ease was a good candidate as a mediator of the impact of 
complexity upon policy attitudes because it predicted attitudes (B = .23, SE = .04), t(196) = 
6.25, p < .001. When attitude was regressed on both processing ease and condition, the 
effect of complexity was reduced to nonsignificance (see fig. 2). Bootstrapping revealed the 
mediation effect of fluency was B = –.38, CI = [–.56, –.22], corroborating that reading about 
the policy in complex language lead to less processing ease and in turn less positive policy 
attitudes. Altogether, these results imply that when complex language typifies policies 
brought to a popular vote, citizens’ attitudes toward them are less positive than they would 
be otherwise. The negative impact of textual complexity on valenced judgments of schol-
arly texts (Oppenheimer, 2006) appears to generalize to policy language, revealing another 
context in which disfluency attenuates positive evaluations. If policy complexity interferes 
with policy support, some citizens may fail to vote in accordance with their latent prefer-
ences—if they vote at all. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Low processing ease mediates the negative impact of complexity on attitudes. 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. ***p < .001. 
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While our results corroborated the fluency-attitude hypothesis and supported a simpli-
fied fluency-voting hypothesis, our manipulation of complexity may not have operational-
ized disfluency in the most direct way. Thus, we conducted a second study. Participants 
were presented the policy either in complex language, simple language, or simple lan-
guage in a disfluent font. We predicted that participants exposed to the simple language 
manipulation would report greater processing ease and this would predict both greater 
voting likelihood and more positive policy attitudes. 
 
STUDY 2 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Given Study 1, we predicted directional effects in which the simple condition would gen-
erate greater processing ease and thus greater voting likelihood and more positive policy 
attitudes. Thus, for all relevant contrasts and correlations, we used directional/one-tailed 
tests of significance (the exception being omnibus F tests). Desiring .80 in power and se-
lecting d = –.27 (just under the smallest effect size observed in Study 1), we aimed for N = 
513. 
The sample (N = 520)1 was composed of MTurk workers residing in one of the 44 US 
states. The sample was 57% female, 18–76 years old (M = 36.53, SD = 13.97), 78% White (14 
also Latino), 10% Black (7 also reporting additional ethnicities), 8% Asian (6 participants 
also White), 2% Latino only, and had 9 Native Americans (6 also White and/or Latino), 4 
Pacific Islanders (3 reporting additional ethnicities), and 2 Middle Easterners (1 also Native 
American). The sample leaned slightly Democrat (M = 3.38, SD = 1.61). Forty-three percent 
of participants did not have a BA/BS, 11% were seeking a BA/BS, 31% had a BA/BS, 3% 
were graduate students, and 12% had graduate degrees. Fifty-two percent of participants’ 
parents did not have a BA/BS, 25% had one parent with at least a BA/BS, and 23% had two 
parents with at least a BA/BS. 
 
Procedure and Measures 
MTurk participants completed the questionnaire via Qualtrics and received payment. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to read about the policy in complex language, simple 
language, or simple language in a disfluent font. This latter condition was operationalized 
by making the font smaller, italicized, and gray (see Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Follow-
ing the manipulation, participants completed the measures of processing ease (M = 4.10, 
SD = 1.80), voting likelihood (M = 5.46, SD = 1.60), and policy attitude (α = .87, M = 4.89, SD 
= 1.21). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We analyzed the DVs as within-participants and condition as between-participants, result-
ing in a 3 (DV) × 3 (disfluent font/complex/simple) mixed model. We found inequality of 
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means across DVs, F(2, 1035) = 149.39, p < .001. More importantly, the manipulation im-
pacted the DVs, F(2, 1035) = 41.42, p < .001. Consistent with hypotheses, processing ease 
and voting likelihood were greater and policy attitudes more positive among individuals 
in the simple condition compared with those in the complex condition, d = –.94, t(344) = –
8.84, p < .001, and disfluent font condition, d = –.25, t(346) = –2.35, p ≤ .01. 
However, the effect of condition was qualified by an interaction with DV factor, F(4, 
1031) = 14.24, p < .001. We analyzed the DVs separately, finding differences in effect size. 
The manipulation impacted processing ease, F(2, 517) = 56.32, p < .001. Those in the simple 
condition report greater processing fluency (M = 4.86, SD = 1.46, SE = .11) than those read-
ing the complex text (M = 3.06, SD = 1.74, SE = .13), d = –1.12, t(344) = –10.44, p < .001, and 
those reading the disfluent font (M = 4.37, SD = 1.68, SE = .13), d = –.31, t(346) = –2.86, p = 
.002. Thus, the ease of understanding the technologies in simple language was indeed un-
dermined by a disfluent font. The manipulation also impacted voting likelihood, F(2, 517) 
= 9.63, p < .001. Those in the simple condition reported greater voting likelihood (M = 5.79, 
SD = 1.53, SE = .12) than those reading the complex text (M = 5.06, SD = 1.66, SE = .13), d = 
–.46, t(344) = –4.28, p < .001, and those reading the disfluent font (M = 5.51, SD = 1.52, SE = 
.12), d = –.18, t(346) = –1.72, p = .04. 
Finally, the manipulation impacted policy attitude, F(2, 517) = 9.98, p < .001. Those in the 
simple condition reported more positive policy attitudes (M = 5.08, SD = 1.26, SE = .10) than 
those in the complex condition (M = 4.56, SD = 1.10, SE = .08), d = –.44, t(344) = –4.07, p < 
.001. However, the difference between the simple condition and disfluent font condition 
(M = 5.03, SD = 1.21, SE = .09), though in the predicted direction, did not achieve signifi-
cance, d = –.04, t(346) = –.36, p < .36. Nevertheless, this result suggests that if processing 
ease significantly mediates any impact of the disfluent font on policy attitudes via indirect-
only mediation, it is consistent with our fluency-policy attitude hypothesis (Zhao, Lynch, 
& Chen, 2010). 
 
Fluency and voting likelihood 
Analyses revealed processing fluency was a good candidate as a mediator of the impact of 
the manipulations on voting likelihood because it predicted voting likelihood (B = .26, SE 
= .04), t(518) = 6.86, p < .001. When regressing voting likelihood on condition (dummy cod-
ing the complex language and disfluent font conditions; Hayes & Preacher, 2014) and on 
processing ease, the effect of the complex language condition was reduced in magnitude 
and the effect of the disfluent font condition was reduced to nonsignificance (see fig. 3). 
Bootstrapping revealed the mediation effect of processing ease for the complex condition 
was B = –.41, CI = [–.58, –.25], corroborating partial mediation.4 The mediation effect for the 
disfluent font condition was also significant, B = –.11, CI = [–.21, –.03]. Thus, the complex 
language and disfluent font manipulations negatively impacted the ease with which par-
ticipants understood the energy policy, in turn attenuating voting likelihood. 
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Figure 3. Low processing ease mediates the negative impact of font disfluency and par-
tially mediates the negative impact of complexity on voting likelihood. Unstandardized 
regression coefficients are reported. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Fluency and policy attitude 
Analyses revealed that processing ease was a good candidate as a mediator of the impact 
of the manipulations on policy attitude because it predicted attitude (B = .29, SE = .03), 
t(518) = 10.74, p < .001. When regressing policy attitude on condition as well as processing 
ease, the effect of the complex condition was reduced to nonsignificance and the effect of 
the disfluent font condition remained nonsignificant (see fig. 4). Bootstrapping estimated 
the mediation effect of processing ease as B = –.51, CI = [–.66, –.38] for the complex condi-
tion and B = –.14, CI = [–.24, –.04] for the disfluent font condition. Thus, the disfluent font 
and complex manipulations decreased processing ease, in turn leading to less positive pol-
icy attitudes. While the total effect of the disfluent font condition upon policy attitude was 
nonsignificant, recently researchers have argued against a need for an “effect to be medi-
ated.” In doing so, Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) have argued that both the pattern of 
mediation for the complex manipulation and that of indirect-only mediation for the dis-
fluent font manipulation are consistent with our hypothesis. 
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Figure 4. Low processing ease mediates the negative impact of complexity and mediates 
(indirect-only) the negative impact of font disfluency on attitudes. Unstandardized re-
gression coefficients are reported. **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
These results suggest once again that the policy domain is not one in which textual com-
plexity—as well as disfluency operationalized with a disfluent font—is interpreted as evi-
dence of a higher quality policy. The decrease in processing ease due to both disfluent 
experimental conditions mediated negative impacts on policy attitudes, contributing to the 
processing fluency literature the finding that the policy domain appears not to be an ex-
ception with regard to negative associations between disfluency and liking (Schwarz, 
2004). 
 
General Discussion 
 
Generally, we found support for our hypotheses. Participants reading a complexly worded 
policy did appear motivated to trust policy agencies more than those encountering the 
policy in simple language, consistent with compensatory control theory (Shepherd & Kay, 
2012). However, such trust did not appear responsible for lowered voting likelihood and 
was not itself directly explained by lowered processing ease—somewhat contrary to pre-
dictions. What our results did corroborate were disfluency-voting and disfluency-policy 
attitude hypotheses. Specifically, our results suggest that complexly worded policies may 
encourage abstention and negatively impact policy support via low processing ease. Given 
that complex language often characterizes policies brought to a popular vote, some citizens 
may not vote in accordance with their latent preferences should they vote at all. These 
findings provide greater understanding of mechanisms behind consequences of statutes, 
amendments, and ordinances written in technical language. These findings also suggest 
individuals like a policy less when its text is disfluent. The typically observed negative 
impact of disfluency on attitudes and judgments (Oppenheimer, 2006; Schwarz, 2004) ap-
pears to apply in the policy domain. 
These results reveal an impediment to the political engagement envisioned by direct 
democracy advocates. However, simply reducing the complexity of policies’ language 
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could lead fewer citizens to abstain from voting and reduce unrepresentative vote choices. 
Conversely, these results imply that using complex language in policy descriptions may 
keep policies from passing, as complexly worded policies appear to encourage abstention 
as well as negative voting. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Our experimental designs complement past research by offering greater internal validity. 
However, caution regarding the interpretation of mediational analyses is necessary be-
cause associations between DVs remain correlational. Our results corroborate our causal 
framework but they should not be interpreted as confirmatory given the limitations of me-
diational analyses (Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011). Nevertheless, taken together, the re-
sults of prior research and our experiments converge to suggest the complexity of policies’ 
language is problematic for the accomplishment of the goals of direct democracy. Field 
experiments with greater ecological validity represent a promising next step in this re-
search program. Scholars’ future efforts might involve collaborating with political mobili-
zation groups to create materials paralleling policy information while manipulating 
textual fluency and observing voters’ preferences and actions. 
These findings also raise questions about the reach of the compensatory trust motivated 
by encounters with complex policy language. For instance, perhaps encountering incom-
prehensible policies motivates preferences for specific traits during candidate elections. 
Inaccessible policy language might lead individuals to prefer candidates with a more au-
tocratic leadership style because individuals may question the viability and efficacy of par-
ticipatory democracy. When ballots include both policies and candidates, the presence of 
the policies may impact who is elected. Policy complexity may even impact citizens’ pref-
erences for appointed versus elected officials, as electing officials ideally involves under-
standing and competence among voters. Candidates evaluated immediately following 
encountering a complex policy may also be evaluated less positively—showing once again 
a possible means through which policy complexity may impact attitudes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results of the current research suggest that direct democracy as it often appears seems 
to diminish the engagement it was created to foster. Born out of a distrust of institutional 
elites, the design of direct democracy may ironically make people trust them more. De-
signed to invigorate Americans’ participatory spirit, direct democracy may instead encour-
age abstention and disconnect policy attitudes from latent policy preferences. However, 
these outcomes may have less to do with direct democracy itself than with a very specific 
and modifiable feature of its execution. Given the improved understanding of the mecha-
nisms behind such political disengagement, a path toward bringing more citizens into the 
political process is visible. 
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Notes 
 
1. When using Qualtrics, precise sample size can be unclear before looking at the data because of 
observations where participants did not continue beyond the consent form, etc. For Study 1–
Wave 2, we had N = 118 when beginning to process the data, and being close to N = 200, we 
suspended collection. For Study 2, we had N = 520 when processing the data, slightly over N = 
513. 
2. Trust was reversed coded for the purposes of the mixed model because it was the one variable 
predicted to be positively impacted by complexity. 
3. We use the more conservative lower bound df, but results do not differ when using upper bound 
df. 
4. While we mostly conducted one-tailed tests of significance in Study 2, the bootstrapped CIs are 
two-tailed and have been reported unaltered. 
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